
## THINKING BRIDGE (6)

## **Eddie Kantar Summer 2016 Washington DC**



With both sides vulnerable, East opens 3♣. You overcall 4♥, a strong bid. When the bid to your right is weak, a jump by you is strong. Partner makes a slam try by bidding 5♣ and you are soon find yourself in 6♥. West leads the ♣4.


Plan the play. Hearts are 1-1.

You have two possible diamond losers, but in fact you have close to a 100% play to get rid of at least one of them. See it?

Win the ♣A, ruff a club high, draw one round of trumps and play the ♠K, spade to the ace and ruff a spade. If the ♠Q drops, the ♠J is your 12th trick and you can use it to discard a losing diamond. Now you will be taking the diamond finesse for an overtrick.

Say the  $extit{AQ}$  doesn't drop and each defender has followed to three spades. Cross to dummy with a trump and lead the  $extit{AJ}$ . Chances are West will be the one with four spades and East will show out, discarding a club. Simply discard a diamond and allow West to win the  $extit{AQ}$ . West has no safe exit and you take the rest.

But what if somehow East has the four spades to the queen, very unlikely given the 3♣ opening bid, but these things happen. When East produces the ♠Q, ruff and exit with a low diamond. What makes this close to a 100% play? Assuming East has seven clubs for his vulnerable first-seat preempt, East's original distribution was 4-1-1-7. When you exit with a diamond, if East wins the trick he will have to give you a ruff and a sluff, and if West wins the trick he will have to lead smack into your ♠A Q. The full deal:



If you decided to take the spade and diamond finesses, hoping one would work (75%), you didn't give yourself the best chance.