
THINKING BRIDGE (7)

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Accident coming up! You open 2♣, partner responds 2♦, waiting. After you rebid 2♠, partner raises to 3♠. Your agreements are that a raise in this sequence shows a stronger hand than the one partner has. Among other things, it should have at least one ace or a king and a queen or shortness, something that looks like it will produce a trick - not queens, jacks, 9s and 3s! In any case, you bid 4NT and sign off in 5♠ after partner shows zero key cards. West leads the ♣J to East's ace and East returns a low diamond.

Plan the play.

Did you take the diamond finesse hoping it would work (50%) and if it didn't, hope the ♠K would drop singleton (26%)? Or did you unblock the ♠K at trick one so you could win the ♠A and lead a club to the 9, discarding your losing ♠Q on the ♠Q, and then take the spade finesse for an overtrick?

The $\clubsuit 10$ is marked in the West hand. If East had the $\clubsuit A$ 10 x (x), East would not have played the ace at trick one. Why? Because East knows that you are missing two key cards, so his partner must have an entry. In other words, East knows he is not going to lose the $\clubsuit A$ and has a good chance of taking two club tricks if he plays low at trick one. For those two reasons, when East does play the $\clubsuit A$ at trick one, he doesn't have the $\clubsuit 10$. Therefore dumping the $\clubsuit K$ at trick one, winning the $\spadesuit A$ and finessing the $\clubsuit 9$ at trick three stands out like a sore thumb.

When the opponents stop at five of a major after a Blackwood sequence, assume two keycards are missing and defend accordingly.

The full deal

